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THE REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AFFECTING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Warren F. Schwartz* and Eugene W. Harper, Jr.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE writing of this paper began as a search for a standard. We were aware that implementation of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)1 provisions looking to the eventual 
elimination of "subsidies"2 that "distort" international trade had 
fallen on hard times. In the case of export subsidies for manufactured 
goods, where hope was initially entertained that obligations banning 
the use of such subsidies might be assumed by all members, an ex-
tended series of negotiations ultimately produced a renunciation 
of subsidies, which has been accepted by only seventeen developed 
countries.8 The developing countries continue to utilize and defend 
the propriety of export subsidies.4 Little progress has been made with 
respect to other measures, such as production subsidies and the price 
supports for agriculture, that were to be removed by agreement 
,vi.thin the framework of general trade negotiations.5 Finally, only 
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I. 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1947), T .I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The acronym 
GATT is used to describe both the multilateral trade agreement, originally pro-
mulgated in 1947 and subsequently am.ended in several material respects, and the 
organization that implements the agreement. The text of the basic agreement and 
various annexes containing protocols, explanatory notes, and tables giving the official 
citation in the United Nations Treaties Series and effective date of the multitude of 
agreements comprising the GATT framework are collected in IV GATT, BASIC 
INsrRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD]. Three recent works 
deal generally with the history and present activities of GATT: G. CURZoN, MULTI· 
LATERAL COMll!ERCIAL DIPLOMACY, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 'TRADE 
AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICillS AND TECHNIQUE (1965); K. DAM, 
THE GATT; L\W AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J. JACKSON, 
WoRLD TRADE AND THE L\w OF GATT (1969). ' 
2. See GATT, arts. VI and XVI. We will treat the term subsidy at this point to mean 
simply a payment by a government to some private person or firm. We deal with the 
complexities involved in defining and using the term in note 37 infra and accompanying 
text. 
3. Declaration of November 19, 1960, Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4, 
9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961). See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 374 n.24. 
4. See Note by the Secretariat, Incentives for Industrial Exports from Developing 
Countries, GATT Doc. Com. TD/72 (March 17, 1970); Rom, GATT: Export Subsidies 
and Developing Countries, 2 J. WoRI.D TRADE L. 544 (1968). 
5. See K. DAM, supra note 1, at 147, 257-72, esp. 266; J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 
717; Malmgren &: Schlechty, Rationalizing World Agricultural Trade, 4 J. WoRI.D 
TRADE L. 515 (1970). 
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limited agreement could be reached in principle about the types of 
national government support that ought to be eliminated as indirect 
subsidies.6 
This development has been viewed as part of the over-all decline 
in the role of GATT, which has been widely noted and deplored.7 
Essentially two types of proposals have been advanced to restore the 
general effectiveness of GA TT as an instrument of international 
trade regulation.8 One holds that GATT must be reformulated in 
order to establish norms that will be regarded in some degree as 
obligatory by participants in the domestic political processes that 
largely shape international trade policy. The competing view asserts 
that such an effort would be counterproductive, because the attempt 
to extend the orbit of "illegality" to practices that nations wish to 
employ will only serve to worsen the atmosphere in which negotia-
6. The GA'IT panel on subsidies concluded that "it was neither necessary nor 
feasible to seek an agreed interpretation of what constituted a subsidy. It would prob• 
ably be impossible to arrive at a definition which would at the same time include all 
measures that fall within the intended meaning of the term in Article XVI without 
including others not so intended." Report of the Panel on Subsidies, 10th Supp BISD 
201, 208 (1962). An earlier report had, however, listed a group of measures which "the 
governments prepared to accept the declaration [cited in note 3 supra had] ••• agreed 
that, for the purpose of that declaration • • • [were] to be considered as subsidies in 
the sense of Article XVI:4." Report of the Panel on Subsidies, 9th Supp. BISD 185, 187 
(1961). The remaining countries "were not able to subscribe ••• to a precise interpreta• 
tion of the term 'subsidies', but had no objection to the ••• interpretation being ac• 
cepted by the ••• parties to [the] declaration." Id. The measures were 
(a) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on 
exports or re-exports; 
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters; 
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare 
charges on industrial or commercial enterprises; 
(d) The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than 
charges in connexion with importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several 
stages on the same goods if sold for internal consumption; or the payment, in 
respect of exported goods, of amounts exceeding those effectively levied at one or 
several stages on these goods in the form of indirect taxes or of charges in con-
nexion with importation or in both forms; 
(e) In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental agencies of imported 
raw materials for export business on different terms than for domestic business, 
the charging of prices below world prices; 
(f) In respect of government export credit guarantees, the charging of premiums 
at rates which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs 
and losses of the credit insurance institutions; 
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) 
of export credits at rates below those which they have to pay in order to obtain 
the funds so employed; · 
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by e.xporters in ob-
taining credit. 
Id. at 186-87. 
7. See K. DAM, supra note 1, at 8; J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1-3; Hudec, GATT 
or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE 
L.J. 1299 (1971). 
8. See Hudec, supra note 7 (review of the proposals that have been advanced to im• 
prove the functioning of GA TT). 
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tions are conducted. The real need, it is urged, is for a better pro-
cedural framework in which to strive for agreement. 
We thought that an examination of the issues underlying the 
unresolved subsidy question, 9 with a view to seeing if it was possible 
to formulate a rule that both gives effect to the essential considera-
tions and is susceptible to objective application, might illuminate 
the basic controversy about how best to structure the regulation of 
international trade. And so we began our search for a standard. 
We believe that we have succeeded in isolating the essential fac-
tor that explains the failure of existing regulation to deal effectively 
with the problems of subsidies. A subsidy is treated in the GATT 
framework as a "distortion" of international trade,10 that is, as cre-
ating a disparity between the actual costs incurred in producing a 
particular good and those which must be borne by the firm under-
talcing its production.11 In fact, however, much (perhaps all) govern-
ment support can be defended as being a "correction" rather than a 
"distortion" of the market process. The need for correction is said 
to derive from the existence of "externalities,"12 that is, costs or bene-
fits that are borne or reaped by nonparties to a transaction13 and are 
9. The point has frequently been made that because of the substantial reduction 
in conventional trade barriers, i.e., tariffs and quantitative restrictions, the relative 
importance of measures such as subsidies has greatly increased. See, e.g., R. BALDWIN, 
NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 110 (1970); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, REPORT: UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
EcONOI>fiC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 89 (1971); Report of the Panel on 
Subsidies, 10th Supp. BISD 201, 202, para. 5 (1962). 
10. See w. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE REsToRATION OF WoRID TRADE, AN 
ANALYSIS AND A.I'l'RAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS 
AND TRADE 214-15 (1950); K. DAM, supra note 1, at 132. 
11. Curiously, there is no distinction drawn among subsidies on the basis of the 
policy objectives they are designed to implement. The subsidy as an instrument of 
policy has received considerable attention in the economic literature. The conceptual 
development can be traced through a reading of the following articles: Haberler, Some 
Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade, 60 ECON. J. 223 (1950); Bhagwati 
&: Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 
J. PoL. ECON. 44 (1963), both reprinted in AM. EcoN. AssN., READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMICS 213, 230 (R. Caves &: H. Johnson ed. 1968); Johnson, Optimal Trade Inter-
vention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions, in TRADE, GROWTH, AND THE BALANCE 
OF PAYMENrS 3 (1965); J. BHAGWATI, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL POLICY: 
DEPARTURES FROM UNIFIED ExCHANGE RATES (Princeton Essays in Intl. Fin. No. 8, 1968). 
12. See Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 
9 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1 (1971), which is a concise discussion of a great deal of the important 
writing on this subject. See also Buclxanan &: Stubblebine, Externality, 29 EcoNOMICA 
371 (1962), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 477 (W. Breit &: H. Hochman ed. 
1968). 
13. Whether one will be a party to a transaction depends on the costs of organizing 
and effectuating a bargain or series of bargains. If the costs of the transaction exceed 
the benefit that could be derived, the person will not participate. See G. TUI.LOCK, 
PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC MEANs 47 (1970); Demsetz, The Private Production of Public 
Goods, 13 J. LAW & ECON, 293 (1970). 
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not therefore taken into account in the market process.14 
As a result, the issue is not that of identifying and remedying 
"distortions" but rather of determining if a particular measure on 
balance "corrects" or "distorts" the market process, that is, whether 
it increases or decreases the efficiency with which resources are allo-
cated. Resolution of this question turns upon theoretical and empir-
ical judgments about how well the domestic political system performs 
the tasks of deciding what intervention should be undertaken and im-
plementing the program that is adopted. 
Our inquiry then is into the contribution that an international 
regulatory system can make to improve the process of assessing and 
compensating for externalities. There are three ways this contribu-
tion may be made. First, domestic measures might be tested by some 
international standard of over-all efficiency enhancement. Secondly, 
the domestic political process could be altered by international agree-
ment-for example, one requiring a two-thirds majority in the na-
tional legislature before a particular type of measure could become 
effective. Finally, power to take account of certain externalities could 
be lodged in an international body. 
We will begin by examining the basic contours of the present 
GA TT regulation of subsidies. We will then consider the theory of 
comparative advantage underlying the GA TT regime and introduce 
the complications of externalities and the governmental process de-
signed to take account of them. Finally, we will make some tentative 
suggestions for changes in rules and institutions that might serve to 
improve the present state of affairs. 
II. THE GA TT PROVISIONS 
Three notions seem to explain the GA TT regulation of subsi-
dies. First, if the government pays a share of a firm's costs, the firm 
may be able to capture sales ( either in the domestic or in the foreign 
market) from more efficient rivals who do not receive government 
support. As explained below, if this capture takes place, a misalloca-
tion of resources and a consequent decrease in world production may 
result. The second notion is that some of the reasons which lead gov-
ernments to subsidize must be accepted in fashioning international 
regulation. This concept has not been systematically implemented 
in the regulatory scheme. The final idea is that a government may 
14. Air pollution is the classic example of an external cost or, as it is often termed, 
negative externality. See Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries: 
International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH. L, 
REv. 859 (1972). 
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subsidize export sales in order to enable a domestic firm to compete 
unfairly by underselling its rivals in foreign markets. The objective 
of this tactic presumably is to reap monopoly profits when competi-
tion is diminished sufficiently for the subsidized firm to secure "mar-
ket power." 
The GATT pattern of regulation reflects unresolved tensions 
among these often conflicting notions. Section A of article XVI of 
GATT requires notification of "any su~sidy, including any form of 
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to 
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any 
product into, [a] territory." This section reflects the first notion de-
scribed above, the objection to a subsidy as causing a misallocation 
of resources by enabling a firm to capture sales from a more efficient 
rival. The section does not, however, come to grips with the second 
basic notion-the justification for certain subsidies. Instead, ap-
parently because no standard for separating good from bad reasons 
could be devised, the remedial system imposes no substantive pro-
hibition whatever. If, however, "serious prejudice to the interests of 
any other contracting party is caused or threatened by ... [the] sub-
sidization," the subsidizing party is called upon to "discuss with the 
other ... party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization."16 Thus the 
section articulating the fundamental objection to subsidies as a cause 
of the misallocation of the world's resources does nothing more than 
call for notification and, only if serious prejudice to another country 
may result, consultation with the interested parties or responsible 
GATT officials. 
Section B of article XVI deals principally with subsidies on ex-
ports. Export subsidies are viewed more harshly under sectionB than 
are subsidies in general under section A. There appear to be two 
reasons for the different attitude. First, as is more fully explained be-
low,16 it is more difficult to justify export subsidies than production 
or consumption subsidies on grounds of efficiency. Most of the "exter-
nalities" that subsidies are designed to correct apply equally to goods 
sold domestically and to those traded internationally. This distinc-
tion is often drawn in the literature;17 however, we are not aware of 
any evidence indicating what significance, if any, it had in the fram-
ing of the GA TT provision. The second respect in which export 
15. GATT, art. XVI, sec. A, para. 1. 
16. See pt. m. B. infra. 
17. See J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 11; Johnson, supra note 11, at 6. 
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subsidies vary from subsidies in general undoubtedly did influence 
the adoption of a more severe treatment for some types of export sub-
sidies. This reason is based on the third notion discussed above-that 
export subsidies enable a firm to sell at a lower price in the foreign 
market in order to eliminate competition and then reap monopoly 
profits.18 
As in section A, the provisions of section B reflect an awareness 
that the regulation must take into account certain national policies 
underlying the grant of export subsidies. The result is a two-part solu-
tion that provides different treatment for subsidies on primary and 
nonprimary products.19 With respect to export subsidies on primary 
products, which are commonly used throughout the world, the par-
ties are called upon only to "seek to avoid ... [their] use."20 Thus 
this provision goes beyond section A in actually condemning the 
export subsidies through the "seek to avoid" formulation, but stops 
short, in apparent recognition of their widespread use, of a compre-
hensive prohibition.21 
The portion of section B dealing with export subsidies on non-
primary products goes farthest in prohibiting use of the device. The 
parties are called upon at "the earliest practicable date" to stop using 
18. The most influential articulation of the notion that subsidies may be a form 
of government-supported price discrimination can be found in J. VINER, DUMPING: A 
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90, 163 (1923). See also w. BROWN, supra note 10, at 
117. 
19. A primary product is defined as "any product of farm, forest or fishery, or 
any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is custom• 
arily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade," 
GATT, ad art. XVI, sec. B, note 2, 
20. GATT, art. XVI, sec. B, para. 3. Although all of the other parts of section B deal 
only with subsidies on exports, paragraph 3 anomalously provides that if "any form 
of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product" is granted, it 
"shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product" (emphasis added). The 
fundamental meaning of the phrase "equitable share" has never been articulated, For 
a review of the decisions interpreting the term, see J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 393-95, 
and authorities cited therein. 
One possible meaning of economic significance would be that share of the market 
that a country would have in the absence of any subsidies or other government inter-
vention. Such an interpretation would restrict the use of subsidies to instances in 
which it was necessary to offset interventionist measures by other countries, Applica• 
tion of this standard would require complex evaluations based on "second-best theory." 
That is, it would be necessary to decide what would happen if there were no inter• 
vention and then to determine if the particular measure, in light of the fact that 
there is existing intervention, represents a movement toward or away from the outcome 
that would have been reached without government intervention. See Lipsey & Lancaster, 
The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REv. OF EcoN. STUDIES 11 (1956). We will 
not deal with the question of "second-best" justification for subsidies. 
21. The failure to prohibit these subsidies may also reflect a recognition that they 
may sometimes be a second-best solution in the face of import restrictions on primary 
products that countries often impose, 
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subsidies that result "in the sale of [a] product for export at a price 
lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to 
buyers in the domestic market."22 In 1961, seventeen countries de-
clared their willingness to cease the use of such subsidies.23 The 
strength of this provision apparently results from three factors. 
There is first the relative skepticism about the justification for 
export subsidies noted above-although again no evidence of the 
influence of this idea can be adduced. Second, export subsidies for 
nonprimary products are much less commonly employed. Finally, 
and perhaps most significantly, the prohibition is limited to instances 
in which a lower price is being charged in export sales-cases pre-
sumably in which subsidization is being practiced as a species of 
"unfair competition" -the third basic notion behind the GA TT 
subsidy provisions. 
Article VI, the second principal GATT provision dealing with 
subsidies, authorizes individual importing countries to neutralize the 
effect of a subsidy by levying a "countervailing duty" in "an amount 
equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy ... granted, directly or 
indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of [the] prod-
uct."24 The countervailing duty cannot be levied, however, unless 
the "effect of the ... subsidization ... is ... to cause or threaten 
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to 
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry."25 Thus 
22. GATT, art. XVI, sec. B, para. 4. 
23. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
24. GATT, art. VI, para. 3. 
25. GATT, art. VI, para. 6(a). Article VI is included within part II of GATT, 
which applies "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Protocol 
of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, para. l(b), IV BISD 77 (1969). The American countervailing duty statute (now 
19 U.S.C. 1303 (1970)) predates GATT and need not by reason of the Protocol of 
Provisional Application conform to article VI. Countervailing duties have been levied 
very infrequently under American law, apparently in large part because of the un• 
willingness of the Executive to invoke the statute. The text of the American law varies 
materially from the GATT provision since it does not forbid the levying of both 
countervailing and dumping duties, does not except failure to collect or remission of 
tax on exports, and has no injury requirement. It also extends to privately financed 
subsidization but has never been so applied. The variation, however, has in practice 
been much less. Both countervailing and dumping duties are not levied, and remission 
of no more than a tax previously levied (despite early judicial authority indicating 
the contrary-see Nicholas &: Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1918); Downs v. United 
States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903)) has not been regarded as a subsidy. It is impossible to say 
whether a species of "injury" requirement has in fact been applied. The Treasury De-
partment exercises considerable discretion in deciding whether to impose a countervail-
ing duty. See United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P .A.), 
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1971). It seems reasonable to suppose that 
the impact on a domestic industry is a factor bearing on the exercise of discretion. How-
ever, no explanation of the Treasury's exercise of discretion in a particular case is 
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the provision does not distinguish between export subsidies and sub-
sidies in general, primary and nonprimary products, or the various 
reasons why the government may have intervened. The only limita-
tion on the general authorization is that the requisite injury or threat 
of injury to a domestic industry be demonstrated. This provision 
appears then to represent the most unambiguous application of the 
"unfair competition" rationale for regulating subsidies. 
We shall not treat at length the question of "unfair competition" 
through government subsidization of export sales. This special case 
need not be dealt with in resolving the basic issue of how the "dis-
torting" and "efficiency-enhancing" aspects of government subsidiza-
tion are to be reconciled. If a subsidy may lead to the misallocation 
of resources in all instances in which it has the effect described by 
section A of article XVI-that is, when it operates to increase exports 
or decrease imports-there is reason enough to ban its use regardless 
of whether it also leads to the subsidized firm's gaining market power. 
If what is needed is some threshold requirement of substantiality in 
the impact of the subsidy, this can be stated in straightforward terms 
without the extraneous notion, introduced by the "injury" concept, 
of damage to the competitive vitality of a domestic industry. 
We do say in passing that recent ·writing about the problem of 
price discrimination casts very great doubt on the validity of the 
idea that selling below cost ("predatory pricing") in a market is an 
effective way to gain and enjoy market power. This basic notion, 
which underlies the regulation both of "dumping" (in which the 
firm itself finances the "predatory pricing") and of subsidies (as 
government-financed "predatory pricing"), has been disputed on 
both empirical and theoretical grounds.26 The point simply is that 
publicly available. As to the application of the American law, see generally Butler, 
Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidiuztion, A Re-Emerging Issue in International 
Trade, 9 VA. J. INTL. L. 82 (1968); Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination 
of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty 
Law, 1 LAw & PoL. IN INTL. Bus. 17 (1969); U.S. Treasury Dept., Countervailing Duties, 
in PAPERS SUBMIITED TO THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNVESnmNT 
POLICY 409 (1971) (summarizing general enforcement policy). 
26. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 548, 587 (1969), 
and authorities cited therein. There is a secondary justification offered for prohibiting 
international price discrimination. The idea basically is that a firm selling at a lower 
price in one market must--be obtaining the financing to do so from some source-for 
example, monopoly profits in the home market or government support-and that this 
source is somehow "unreliable." If the likelihood that this support will continue is for 
some reason exceptionally difficult to appraise, then conceivably domestic rivals will 
make costly mistakes in responding to the foreign competition that the government 
might be able to prevent (at a cost lower than the social cost of the mistakes) by ap• 
propriate intervention. The whole question is complicated by the fact that charging 
different prices may not reflect any "artficial" support at home but rather factors such 
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in order for the tactic to be feasible, the gains from monopoly pric-
ing after all rivals have been driven out and before the high price 
causes re-entry and renewed competition must exceed the losses in-
curred in selling below cost during the "predatory" stage. The em-
pirical evidence indicates that this will rarely if ever be the case.27 
In any event, government-financed "predatory pricing" is a dif-
ferent question from the one with which we wish to deal. Our inter-
est is in examining the reasons why the great range of subsidies, 
which are not used in a "predatory" fashion, are granted, in order 
to decide how they ought to be regulated in a well-conceived system 
of international trade regulation. To do this we must first develop 
more fully the theory of comparative advantage upon which GA TT 
is fundamentally grounded. 
III. THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND SUBSIDIES 
A. The Traditional Analysis 
The theory of comparative advantage28 represents an adaptation 
to international trade of the basic notion that the value of domestic 
output will be maximized if resources are allocated through private 
market transactions.29 This theory assumes that most factors of pro-
duction move freely in the domestic market to locations where the 
highest value is placed upon them. In the international market, 
however, there is insufficient mobility of certain factors of production 
for a completely efficient allocation of resources.30 Many factors do 
as decreasing average costs or the desire to enter a market by initially charging "pro-
motional" prices. In any event, the recent developments on these questions have not 
been brought to bear in a systematic re-evaluation of the international regulation of 
what is conceived to be privately or publicly financed dumping. See K. DAM, supra 
note 1, at 170-72 (suggesting need for re-evaluation): Anthony, The American Response 
to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises, and Re-
structured Procedures After the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 159, 163-77 
(1968) (reviewing economic justification of present dumping laws). 
27. See Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. LA.w &: EcoN. 43 
(1969); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LA.w &: 
ECON. 137 (1958). 
28. For three general treatments of the theory (in roughly ascending order of dif-
ficulty), see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS ch. 34 (8th ed. 1970): C. KlNDLEBERGER, INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOJIUCS chs. 1-3 (4th ed. 1968); H. HELLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THEORY 
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE chs. 1-5, esp. ch. 2 (1968). 
29. This statement, to be strictly true, must assume perfect competition and an 
acceptable initial distribution of wealth. 
30. See, e.g., H. HELLER, supra note 28, at 3. The question of how freely factors do 
in fact move is an empirical matter. The theoretical work begins, however, with an 
assumption of complete immobility which may, of course, be relaxed in varying degrees 
when dealing with particular questions. See id. at 3-4, 6; C. KlNDLEBERGER, supra note 
28, at 4-6. 
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not freely cross national boundaries and, therefore, a given country 
may be deficient in the resources necessary to engage efficiently in 
certain industries. Consequently, if all countries were to attempt to 
satisfy their domestic demands solely with domestically produced 
goods, total world production would be less than could be achieved 
through trade. For all countries will gain economically if each coun-
try first specializes in the production of those goods in which it has 
the greatest efficiency relative to alternative uses of domestic resources 
and then trades with other countries that similarly allocate their re-
sources.31 
The objection to subsidies within this framework is that they 
distort the resource-allocating function of the market and thereby 
reduce the benefits derived from specialization reflecting compara-
tive advantage coupled with trade. When, for example, a govern-
ment makes a payment to the producer of a certain good, the sub-
sidy reduces the cost of production, or private cost, as it appears to 
the producer without reducing the real or social cost32 of such pro-
duction, that is, the output that must be forgone in order to make 
the subsidized goods. As a result of the subsidy, resources will be 
employed in producing the subsidized goods rather than other goods 
of greater real value. The domestic loss, then, is the drop in the value 
of total domestic output that occurs when resources are not put to 
their most productive use. 
Subsidies, moreover, not only force domestic resources from their 
most productive use but also divert otherwise efficiently allocated 
resources from competing foreign industries by denying to those in-
dustries the sales captured by the subsidized product. Thus, neither 
the domestic nor foreign country specializes in accordance with com-
parative advantage and total world output is reduced. 
B. Externalities, Subsidies, and Welfare 
The preceding simpiified analysis does not take account of ex-
ternalities. 33 Since resources are allocated in private market transac-
31. We have stressed the gains from specialization in production, which are most 
significant for our analysis. If two countries have different preferences for goods 
("Community Indifference Curves'), they could both be made better off through trade 
even if it is assumed that they are identical from the viewpoint of production, There 
are thus gains to be derived from specialization in consumption as well as production, 
See H. HELLER, supra note 28, ch. 4. 
32. We use the term social cost to mean what is often called "real" or "opportunity" 
cost. For an explanation of this concept, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
LAW &: ECON, 1 (1960). 
33. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text. 
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tions by people responding to prices that they are offered for 
performing various tasks, the failure of an externality to affect the 
price (by either increasing or decreasing it) leads to a misallocation 
of resources. This misallocation occurs because market choices are 
made among alternative uses of resources not on the basis of the so-
cial value of those uses but on the basis of a price that varies from 
the social value by the amount of the externalities arising from those 
uses. 
It will be recalled that the traditional analysis found subsidies 
objectionable not because they lowered private costs but rather 
because they made private costs appear lower than social costs. But 
externalities may exist that cause social costs in fact to be lower than 
private costs. For if the value that society places on the production of 
a good is not, for some reason, fully reflected in market transactions, 
its social value is higher and the costs to society of forgone production 
are correspondingly lower. Under these conditions, a subsidy in the 
amount that nonparty beneficiaries would pay if there were a func-
tioning market for the externality can theoretically be justified as in-
creasing efficiency. This kind of subsidy would, moreover, add to, 
rather than reduce, the gains from trade coupled with specialization, 
which are predicted by the theory of comparative advantage.34 
We shall try to illuminate these points by considering three types 
of subsidies that have significant impact on international trade. Be-
fore examining these measures, however, it is necessary to clarify 
certain threshold verbal and conceptual ambiguities in the meaning 
of the term "subsidy,"35 which we have so far confined to the case 
of a direct payment. 
1 
As we have indicated, the international regulation of subsidies 
is thought to be required because their effect on private costs results 
in the misallocation of resources. The difficulty is that the simplified 
model under which subsidies are viewed as "distortions" takes no 
account whatever of a public sector. If nothing else is happening in 
the public sector and firm A receives a hundred dollar payment, it 
can fairly be said to be subsidized in that amount. When, however, 
account is taken of the fact that there is a governmeJ!t that is both 
34. See note 11 supra. 
35. See E. ROLPH, THE THEORY OF FISCAL ECONOMICS (1954); Hubbell, Concealed 
Subsidies in the Federal Budget, IO NAn.. TAX J. 214 (1957); Kaysen, On Defining a 
Subsidy, in PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Harvard Grad. School of Pub. Adm. Y.B. 1953); Robinson, 
What Is a Government Subsidy?, 20 NAn. TAX J. 86 (1967); Subsidies and Subsidy-
Effect Programs of the U.S. Government (Materials prepared for the Joint Economic 
Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965)). 
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taxing and spending, the issue becomes much more complex.86 Every 
activity is potentially subject to the burden of taxation and the bene-
fit of government expenditure. The choice among activities in the 
private sector is inevitably influenced by the net impact of burden 
and benefit created by the public sector. The issue in assessing the 
impact on resource allocation of a particular form of government 
intervention then becomes not simply whether an amount is paid 
to or received by a firm but, more generally, whether the measure 
in some way alters the relative profitability of various activities. For 
example, if it is assumed that everyone is engaged either in farming 
or manufacturing and a statute is passed granting farmers ten dollars 
per unit of output and manufacturers one dollar per unit of output, 
the effect is to increase the allocation of resources to farming. But 
the same effect would result from differential tax rates favoring 
farmers. 
We will use the term "subsidy," therefore, to extend to all gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure measures that have the effect of 
altering returns to various activities and thereby influencing the 
allocation of resources.87 In using the term, we do not imply any 
36. The notion that there is no "neutral" place to begin an evaluation of govern• 
ment intervention since existing government structure must be assumed is analyzed 
in C. SHOUP, PuBLIC FINANCE 7-19 (1969). 
37. Our analysis would in theory extend beyond taxing and spending to include, 
for example, quantitative restrictions or qualitative requirements that have resource-
allocation effects. Our definition of subsidies is broader than others that have been 
employed. Most significantly, we include measures having allocational effects that may 
have been designed principally to redistribute income according to some prevailing 
n.otion of "equity." We include these both because the precise objective of a given 
measure is often unclear and because redistribution by government is frequently justified 
on grounds of efficiency as well. That is, redistributional taxation and transfer of wealth 
can be viewed as a way for the relatively affluent to purchase the direct or indirect 
benefits which result when others in the society enjoy a decent living standard. (Com• 
pare the limited definition of the term, excluding provisions principally designed for 
income redistribution, adopted for purposes of evaluating the American tax laws by 
Aaron, Inventory of Existing Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX lNSTlTUTE OF AMERICA, 
TAX INCENTIVES 39, 40-41 (1971); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 705, 706-13 (1970)). 
We have also excluded from consideration the subject of border tax adjustments, 
that is, the rebate of value-added taxes on exports and the corresponding imposition of 
an equivalent tax on imports. There are several reasons for this exclusion. First, the 
issue of the resource-allocation effect of these measures is largely an empirical one, and 
turns on the question of who bears the incidence of the tax. Second, if the border tax 
adjustment leads to an over-all increase in the price of imports and a decrease in the 
price of exports, it is equivalent to a partial devaluation and correctible under the 
present monetary system through adjustments of the exchange rate. Finally, to the 
extent that the border tax adjustment is a reflection of the prevailing notion of tax 
"equity"-that is, that "consumption" should be the basis for distributing the tax 
burden-adequate treatment would involve the range of issues subsumed under the 
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judgment about the desirability of the particular measure in ques-
tion. 
It is now necessary, as the final preliminary matter before con-
sidering the various examples of subsidies affecting international 
trade, to explain more fully the criterion of efficiency-enhancement 
that we will apply in analyzing the effects of subsidies in these areas. 
Modem welfare economics proceeds on the assumption that it is im-
possible (noneconomic value judgments aside) to make interpersonal 
comparisons of the amount of satisfaction ("utility") that people 
realize from the occurrence of various events.38 The basic yardstick 
is therefore individual preference-which, however, need not in any 
psychological sense be selfish. Utility can be assigned, for example, 
to alleviation of the suffering of other people. 
Since interpersonal comparisons cannot be made, the controlling 
standard in evaluating a given event must take into consideration 
all preferences held by individuals in the group under consideration. 
The standard that is generally applied is that of Pareto optimality: 
A change in price or output in an economy is a move toward Pareto 
optimality only when someone is made better off and no one is made 
worse off. Pareto optimality is theoretically reached when it is not 
possible to make someone better off without making someone else 
worse off, that is, when the possibilities of improvement through 
voluntary exchange have been exhausted.89 In order to know whether 
a given change represents a move toward Pareto optimality, it is nec-
essary to know when individuals are in fact better off-to know their 
preferences. As has been noted above, we will be dealing principally 
with situations in which all of the relevant preferences are not re-
vealed in private transactions so that the government, in order to ap-
proximate Pareto optimality, attempts to assess and give effect to the 
additional preferences. 
We ·will now consider how three government measures, often 
question of fiscal harmonization. See FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MARKE'I's, 
VoLTJME 1: THEORY (C. Shoup ed. 1967). 
For a detailed discussion of the subject of border tax adjustments, see, e.g., C. FULDA 
&: W. SCHWARTZ, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT 469-79, and authorities cited in 474 n.1 (1970); J. GASTON&: w. SMITH, 
BORDER TAXES AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC COMl'ETITION '(1970). 
88. See J. BUCHANAN&: G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 171 (Univ. of Mich. 
Press ed. 1965); E. MxsHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TEN !NTRODUCIORY EsSAYS 14 (1969). 
39. v. PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE l'OLITIQUE (1909). For a succinct review of the 
literature following Pareto's original formulation, see Bator, The Simple Analytics of 
Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. EcoN. REv. 22, 57-58 (1957), reprinted in READINGS, supra 
note 12, at 385, 410. 
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asserted to have substantial impact on international trade, may serve 
to produce a more efficient resource allocation, that is, resource al-
location more consonant with the actual production possibilities and 
consumer preferences than that yielded by wholly private transac-
tions. We will then consider the process by which the government 
intervention is framed and implemented in order to appraise its 
effectiveness in achieving the desired improvement. 
1. Research and Development 
Much research and development is conducted at government ex-
pense.40 It appears, moreover, that in technologically sophisticated 
countries like the United States there may be a significant correlation 
between the level of research and development in an industry and 
the propensity to export.41 
Presumably if one country subsidizes research and development, 
firms benefiting from the government expenditure will be able to 
prevail over rivals in other countries that might otherwise be more 
efficient but receive no government support and must therefore bear 
the cost of introducing new products and methods of production.42 
This is a specific instance of the conventional objection to subsidies. 
The complicating factor, however, in assessing the impact on effi-
ciency of subsidies of this kind is that the government's support of 
research and development may be designed to account for certain 
externalities. The basic reason for the subsidy may be that the full 
value of the benefits created by privately conducted research, espe-
cially in the case of basic research, may not be captured by the firm 
40. See C. FREEMAN & A. YOUNG, THE R.EsEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IN 
WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, esp. Table 4, at 72 (1965); 
E. MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ch. VI (1968). It has been 
estimated that the provision of American tax law permitting research and development 
outlays to be treated as expenses rather than capital investments (INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954-, § 174) constitutes an annual subsidy of 500 million dollars. Surrey, supra note 37, 
at 709. It may be helpful to emphasize that subsidization of research and development 
may, but need not, be efficiency enhancing. J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHAL• 
LENGE 112-22 (1968), compared American support for research and development on the 
SST favorably with the British and French effort on the Concorde. 
41. See O'Brien, Trade Patterns and Technology, 5 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 657 (1971). 
42. This assertion, of course, assumes that the results of the research and develop-
ment efforts are enjoyed only by a limited group of firms in the country. See, in this 
regard, France v. Commission of the European Communities, No. 47 /69 (Eur. Ct, J. 
June 25, 1970), which held invalid under article 92 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community, done at Rome March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after EEC Treaty], that part of a French textile tax on imports used to subsidize re• 
search. France argued that all firms in the industry benefited from the research, but 
the Court concluded that French firms benefited far more than did non-French firms. 
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that undertakes it.43 Some of the knowledge gained will be commu-
nicated without payment in exchange to employees, suppliers, cus-
tomers, and others with whom the firm deals. 
These benefits, commonly referred to as "spillover effects," occur 
for essentially tw-o reasons. First, there are limits on the protection 
afforded by law to knowledge acquired through innovation. Second, 
the costs of devising and implementing transactions to capture the 
value of some of the benefits derived from the innovation (for ex-
ample, the knowledge gained by a firm supplying inputs) may exceed 
the amount that could be realized. As a result of these various factors, 
the amount obtained through private transactions may be less than 
the social value of the innovation. Thus government support of re-
search and development can in principle supply an additional return 
equal to the value that is not captured in private transactions. If it 
performs this function, the result is to enhance efficiency by bringing 
to bear as incentive the true value placed by society on the invention 
rather than the lesser value manifested in the private transaction. 
If the combination of public and private action yields a more 
efficient use of domestic resources because the incentive taken into 
account more accurately reflects the social value of the innovation, 
then the world as a whole can share in the benefits of that use through 
international trade. If this objective has actually been accomplished, 
the proper response is obviously not an international ban or nullifi-
cation of the domestic measure. Indeed, the right thing for other 
countries to do may well be to try to improve efficiency by similarly 
effective use of the public sector. 
2. Agricultural Subsidies 
Subsidy programs that increase the income of persons engaged 
in farming are a commonplace.44 Criticism that these programs lead 
to inefficiency in the allocation of the world's agricultural resources 
is a standard component in analyses of international trade regula-
tion by persons committed to the desirability of a free-trade regime.45 
43. See E. :MANSFIELD, supra note 40, at 186; Arrow, Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources to Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOl\OC REsEARCH, 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INCENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962). Volume 26 of PUBUC 
FINANCE (1971) consists entirely of articles from various countries on the question of 
public support of research and development. 
44. See C. FUI.DA &: W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 268-306; authorities cited in 
note 5 supra. 
45. See, e.g., R. BALDWIN, supra note 9, at 113, 117-18, 125-27; Malmgren &: Schlechty, 
supra note 5; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 141. 
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We believe, however, that these criticisms are valid only if certain 
assumptions are made about the objectives that the government mea-
sures are designed to accomplish. Stated within the framework of our 
analysis, if the government action is designed to give effect to exter-
nalities and succeeds in doing so, it is efficiency enhancing. 
There are two principal externalities to which agricultural sub-
sidies may be responsive. First, for reasons of social preference, it 
may be thought desirable to keep a certain portion of the population 
engaged in agriculture-even if purely private competition would 
result in a smaller number of persons remaining in farming.46 
Second, it may be thought desirable to maintain a level of domestic 
production so that the country would be self-sufficient to some degree 
in the event that foreign supplier countries, for political or military 
reasons, chose not to sell to it.47 
These reasons can be deplored as misguided by those who dis-
agree with them, but there is no way in principle to reject them as 
less legitimate than others in defining what the particular "demand" 
is within a country. It is moreover by no means unreasonable to be-
lieve that such demand exists. For it has often been pointed out that 
income maintenance, which leaves an individual free to choose 
his occupation,48 or government payment of the retraining and 
relocation costs involved in a change of occupation,40 provide 
less costly ways to ameliorate the condition of those who can no 
longer engage in agricultural production in a truly competitive 
market. But the persistence of programs that have the effect of keep-
ing people in farming and domestic production at a certain level 
suggests that there is at least some significant preference for this re-
sult quite apart from the desire simply to increase the income of 
persons presently engaged in farming. 
46. See J. BHAGWAn, supra note 11, at 35; G. CURZON, supra note 1, at 206. 
47. See J. BHAGWATJ, supra note 11, at 33. See also SENATE CoMr,r. ON FINANCE, THE 
SUGAR Am: AMENDMENT OF 1965, S. REP. No. 909, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965), which 
asserts that "it has been the policy of the U.S. Government-for defense and strategic 
reasons-to promote within the United States the ability to produce a substantial por-
tion of our sugar requirements.'' The oil import quota has a similar policy objective. 
See Dam, Implementation of Import Quotas: The Case of Oil, 14 J. LAw &: EcoN. 1, 3 
(1971); Schwartz &: Kindred, American Regulation of Oil Imports: Law, Policy and 
International Responsibility, 5 J. WoRLD L. 267 (1971). 
48. Such a proposal as part of a program to eliminate gradually the present sub• 
sidization of domestic sugar production is offered in Johnson, The Sugar Program: 
Costs and Benefits, in NATIONAL ADVISORY COMllfISSION ON FOOD AND FmER, FOREIGN 
TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL POLicY 3 (1967). 
49. For the suggestion that by reason of "imperfections" in the capital market for 
investment in human capital, such as for retraining and relocation, subsidization of 
expenditures of this kind may be appropriate, see Johnson, supra note 11, at 28. 
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This type of "demand" will not be revealed in private trans-
actions. Although it is theoretically possible for all nonfarmers inter-
ested in supporting farming as an occupation ( or in maintaining a 
particular level of domestic production) to offer a sum of money to 
induce the desired activity, such a process would obviously be wholly 
impracticable. But, once again, the fact that the demand is not mani-
fested in the market does not mean that it does not exist. 
3. Subsidies to Infant Export Industries 
The various reasons for subsidies so far discussed would not 
justify a measure limited to exports. There is no reason to believe 
that the spillover effects of research and development are encountered 
to any larger degree in industries that export. Nor does it matter, if 
the objective is to have more people engaged in farming, whether 
the product of their efforts is sold at home or abroad. Export sub-
sidies, however, can be justified only on the basis of externalities that 
arise in international trade but not in domestic production or con-
sumption. 
We believe, again in principle, that justification of this kind 
may exist. For example, there are good reasons for granting export 
subsidies to infant or "pioneer" export industries.60 The pioneer 
firm, in order to succeed in selling a particular type of product in 
a new foreign market, must incur expenses to learn about market 
conditions and develop an acceptance of its product. The benefits 
of these expenses may "spill over" in several ways. Suppliers, cus-
tomers, employees, and others with whom the firm deals may obtain 
knowledge about the foreign market without having to pay for it 
and may put that knowledge to use to further their own economic 
interests. Firms subsequently attempting to sell in the foreign market 
may benefit (again without payment) from the enhanced reputation 
of goods emanating from the particular country, which was created 
by the pioneer firm.61 Again, a subsidy reflecting these benefits may 
yield a more efficient result than private market transactions. 
50. See J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 13; Rom, supra note 4 (which deals with 
subsidies in less-developed countries faced with overvalued currencies). 
51. Another reason for subsidizing the exports of pioneer firms has been advanced 
in the economic literature. Private firms breaking into a new foreign market may sys-
tematically overestimate the risks involved-especially those such as imposition of 
quotas and tariffs-and at the same time underestimate the capacity of their govern-
ments to protect them abroad against losses in foreign markets. Thus private 
exporters might need temporary export subsidies to induce them to achieve an opti-
mum level of exports because of this asymmetry between the estimation of risks in the 
domestic and foreign markets. 
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IV. THE EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
We have so far assumed that the government subsidy perfectly 
reflects social preferences, and that the information about those 
preferences which is necessary to formulate the correct subsidies has 
somehow been assembled without cost. Neither of these assumptions, 
of course, accords with the reality of how decisions are made in the 
political process. The choice is not between a market system that does 
not take account of externalities and a political process that perfectly 
records and corrects the externalities. In fact, both alternatives are 
imperfect. 
As we have indicated, the principle reason why government in-
tervention may be necessary is that it is too costly in private transac-
tions to take account of certain consequences of the particular 
conduct in question. Government action can reduce the costs of as-
certaining and reacting to these consequences in two ways. First, by 
having representation of a large group (the general population) by a 
much smaller one (the elected representatives) and adopting decision-
making rules requiring less than unanimity, the costs of reaching 
agreement approximating the relevant preferences are reduced,li2 
These are savings that can be achieved through any form of group 
organization. Beyond this advantage, however, the government also 
has the power of compulsion. This unique aspect of government is 
There is not, in this case, simply an asymmetry of information between these mar-
kets. If that were the case a subsidy would not be justified because the acquisition of 
information expends real resources, and foreign sales should yield enough returns to 
cover these costs so that the transaction will be· privately and socially desirable. But 
when the private evaluation of risk exceeds the social evaluation there is an e.xternality, 
and the export activity might not be optimal without the subsidy. The externality may 
arise because the government is unwilling or unable to transmit its store of information 
about foreign conditions, which it is continually replenishing in order to conduct interna-
tional affairs, to private firms that could use that information to appraise risks accurately, 
It may be so costly (and possibly for security reasons impossible) to transmit this in• 
formation that it is more efficient for the government simply to pay a subsidy to 
counteract the private bias against international involvement. See J. BHAGWATl, mpra 
note 11, at 13. A similar rationale has been suggested for the role of fixed exchange 
rates in reducing the incidence of fluctuations in the relative values of various cur-
rencies. See A. LANYI, THE CASE FOR FLOATING ExCHANGE RATES REcONSIDERED (Prince-
ton Essays in Intl. Fin. No. 72, 1969); Willett &: Tower, The Welfare Economics of 
International Adjustment, 26 J. FINANCE 287 (1971). 
52. For a discussion of how representative government expresses the preferences of 
a population, see Haefele, A Utility Theory of Representative Government, 61 Ar.r. 
ECON. R.Ev. 350 (1971). See J. BUCHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 63•84, for a 
discussion of the choice of an appropriate decision-making rule. A rational individual 
would choose a decision-making rule which over a range of issues minimizes the sum 
of the costs involved in (I) arriving at a result (where unanimity would be most costly) 
and (2) accepting decisions adverse to his position (where unanimity would be least 
costly). 
April 1972] Subsidies Affecting International Trade 849 
the only means of inducing people in certain circumstances to "re-
veal" their true preferences-that is, to indicate the value they place 
on the external benefits in question. For if payment from all bene-
ficiaries cannot be compelled and there is no way to exclude nonpay-
ers from participating in benefits, all potential beneficiaries will 
conceal their preferences in an effort to take a "free ride" on those 
who do pay.58 The externalities we have considered, e.g., the spill-
over benefits derived from research and development and from the 
efforts of "pioneer" export firms, are specific instances of this phe-
nomenon. 
Obviously, however, a system that does not require unanimity 
may yield measures which, because of the differences in the intensity 
·with which various preferences are held, do not represent an over-all 
increase in welfare.54 Moreover, whatever system is devised will itself 
be costly, for real resources must be employed in operating the po-
litical system. Finally, a governmental political solution inevitably 
requires a second stage of implementation that also involves costs and 
risks of error in measuring the relevant variables. Thus the ultimate 
question is whether the government solution, in light of (1) the an-
ticipated departure from optimality resulting from the less than un-
animous decision and the difficulties of measurement encountered 
upon implementation and (2) the costs of decision-making and im-
plementation, is superior to the private solution that presumably 
fails to take the externality into account. 
We will not try to deal exhaustively either with the process of 
53. Various voluntary arrangements can be devised that also deal with the "free 
ride" problem. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 43-62, for a discussion 
of the choice among the three alternatives: not taking into account the externality, 
devising a private arrangement to do so, and intervening with the coercive power of 
government. For a discussion of private arrangements responsive to "free ride" prob-
lems encountered in international trade, see Schwartz & Wellman, The Rule of Reason 
in EEC Antitrust: Efficiency Enhancement Through Integration by Agreement Among 
Competitors, 12 VA. J. INTL. L. 192 (1972). 
54. To say, for example, that a majority rule produces outcomes that improve 
over-all welfare assumes that the intensity with which voters prefer any given outcome 
is equal. This, of course, is rarely the case. A majority vote rule would produce more 
favorable outcomes in the welfare terms we have used as our yardstick if side payments 
were allowed, that is, if the winning majority could compensate the losing minority 
or if an intense minority could be transformed into a majority by "buying" the votes 
of those with weak preferences. Buying votes is generally forbidden, but logrolling is a 
less perfect way to accomplish the same thing. Since votes are taken over a period of 
time on many different issues, about which voters hold preferences of varying intensity, 
each voter can place a value on each of his votes and engage in trade with other voters. 
By trading their votes, the voters can increase the total welfare they receive from all 
measures passed, over what it would be if they had simply voted yes or no on each 
measure. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 131-45. 
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political decision-making or implementation with respect to subsidies. 
We do, however, note certain inefficiencies that are likely to be 
encountered. The political process, unlike a functioning market, 
does not permit an individual to make a series of discrete choices 
among alternatives as they exist at the time the particular decision 
is made.55 Instead, preferences must be expressed infrequently by 
voting for candidates who are chosen on the basis of their positions 
on a ·wide range of issues. 56 As a result, only a very rough approxima-
tion of the preferences that account for the selection of a particular 
candidate can be made. The representatives must seek to give effect 
to these preferences in the legislative process. Moreover, a measure 
that is passed cannot, with any exactitude, quantify the preferences 
to which it is responsive, for it must operate prospectively and in a 
far greater variety of circumstances than the legislature can be ex-
pected to anticipate or deal with in any detail. Implementation must 
then be entrusted to another set of officials who are to quantify the 
relevant preferences and devise appropriate means to give effect to 
them.57 
Throughout this process, it is to be expected that the preferences 
of beneficiary groups consisting of small numbers of people with 
readily identifiable interests will be more effectively expressed than 
those of large groups with uncertain and dispersed interests.08 In 
the case of legislation regarding subsidies, it is to be anticipated 
that as a result of these factors producers will fare much better than 
taxpayers. I£ this situation occurs, subsidies in excess of the external 
benefits created by the activity may be provided. 09 
In sum, then, just as we could not say in principle that a subsidy 
inevitably leads to a worse allocation of resources because of the possi-
55. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGE• 
MENT SCIENCE 3, 10 (1971). 
56. J. BucHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 134-35, view as implicit logrolling 
the phenomenon of candidates arriving at positions on the range of issues in which 
their constituents are interested in order to gain the total votes required for election. 
57. See, e.g., J. BHAcWATI, supra note 11, at 55, concerning inefficient methods of 
implementing programs designed to increase import substitution and export promo• 
tion; Dam, supra note 47, on the inefficiencies of implementing the oil import quota 
system, which was designed to promote national security by attaining a particular level 
of domestic production. 
58. See J. BUCHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 283-95; Stigler, supra note 55, 
at 12. 
59. This does not necessarily mean that the amount of tax falling on the benefi• 
ciaries of a favorable externality will be excessive. Rather, nonbeneficiaries, as well as 
beneficiaries, might be taxed, and an amount in excess of the external benefits might 
be realized by the producer group. 
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bility that it might accurately give effect to externalities, neither can 
we say that a subsidy inevitably leads to a better allocation of re-
sources because of the possibility that it might be based on an over-
valuation of the externalities of such magnitude that the result would 
be a greater divergence from optimality than if there were no gov-
ernment intervention. 
V. INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
A. Framing an International Standard 
We have now concluded our examination of how subsidization 
may be undertaken for the purpose of enhancing efficiency. The 
next inquiry is into the contribution a standard for permissible sub-
sidies that is administered by an international body can make in 
improving this process. After we examine this question we shall con-
sider the possibility of conferring upon an international institution 
legislative power to take account of externalities. 
When we speak of a standard, of course, we do not necessarily 
mean a rule that can be applied with binding effect by an inter-
national tribunal. There is simply little likelihood that rules of this 
kind will be accepted by the national governments. All we mean by 
a standard is a set of norms that is obligatory in the limited sense that 
it is taken seriously in the domestic political process. The functional 
role of the international body is to legitimatize and give specific 
content to the standard by deciding whether a particular domestic 
measure conforms to it.60 
There are only a few ways in which a standard could conceivably 
contribute to dealing with the question of subsidies. First, it could 
implement the notion that particular preferences, which are in fact 
held by the people of a country, should not be given weight by 
legislators in deciding whether to institute subsidies. Thus, for ex-
ample, the desire to have a certain portion of the population engage 
in agriculture could be said to be "less important" than "efficient" 
agricultural production (by which is meant, of course, "efficient" in 
terms of all production possibilities and preferences exclusive of 
wanting people to engage in agriculture). However, we know of no 
objective basis for adopting such a standard. 
The second basic notion that could be embodied in an inter-
national standard is that the domestic measure is inefficient in terms 
60, See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 776-80; Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A 
Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970); Hudec, supra note 7. 
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of the preferences actually held in the country. This judgment could 
be made on three bases. 
First, it could be asserted that the structure of the domestic 
political process is calculated to lead to oversubsidization. 61 There 
are empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that oversub-
sidization is likely to result under existing systems and certain 
changes have been suggested that would reduce the incidence of 
oversubsidization. For example, it could be required that there be 
a greater majority in the legislature or that the burden of a subsidy 
be placed not on all taxpayers but rather on the purported benefi-
ciaries, a class better able to assess the benefit and oppose the measure 
if they feel it unjustified.62 
We realize that it appears idle to expect that an international 
norm, even if embodied in the mildest of recommendations, would 
be permitted to influence the domestic political structure. Never-
theless, this seems to be the most fruitful area for further exploration. 
The various domestic systems may well be oversubsidizing. It is quite 
likely they could be changed in ways that would lead to greater 
international efficiency. If an international consensus on the changes 
that should be introduced could be reached, it is conceivable that 
significant influence could be brought to bear to restructure the 
domestic process accordingly. 63 
The second respect in which it might be said that a domestic 
measure is inefficient is that there are better ways to accomplish its 
objectives. I£, for example, the purpose of the measure is to increase 
the level of research and development in an industry rather than the 
output of the industry, a subsidy geared to output would be in-
efficient.64 The basic difficulty in approaching a question of this kind 
is that it is unlikely that one of the consequences of a domestic 
measure will be plainly identified as the objective of the legislation. 
The international body would then be required to construe the 
domestic legislation and decide what its objective really was. This 
61. It could, of course, theoretically lead to undersubsidization as well. 
62. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 292. 
63. The political system has sometimes as a matter of national choice been struc• 
tured in such a way as to counteract the tendency in the legislative process toward 
oversubsidization. The executive, often granted considerable latitude in trade matters, 
may be viewed as representing the interests of domestic consumer and foreign pro• 
ducer, interests that are not taken sufficiently into account by the legislature. See 
Schwartz & Kindred, supra note 47, at 294. 
64. If, however, it were very costly to monitor research and development, and output 
would serve as a reasonable proxy more easily measured, the subsidy geared to output 
might be more efficient. 
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is not the type of decision that national governments are likely to 
empower an international body to make. Nor is it one that the 
international body, by reason of its unfamiliarity with the domestic 
political process, is well equipped to make even if authorized to do 
so. Indeed the question may be impossible to answer. People vote 
for legislators for a variety of reasons-including their support of 
certain measures. And the reasons a particular individual may prefer 
a certain measure are also extremely varied. To conclude, after the 
fact, on the basis of evidence of what preferences were held when the 
measure was under consideration, that a particular objective was 
the only one embraced by people supporting the legislation, may be 
little more than an exercise in conjecture-particularly when the 
question of what was the objective never really had to be faced by 
anyone when the measure was under consideration. Additionally, 
if such a conclusion were drawn it would mean that the legislature, 
in terms of its own purposes, had done a poor job. National repre-
sentatives to international bodies would be unlikely to portray the 
national legislature in this fashion. Justification on externality 
grounds is likely to be offered in virtually every case. The interna-
tional body would then find it necessary, if the measure is to be 
judged inefficient, to take a position on the intent of the legislation 
that is at odds with the one advanced by the representatives of the 
government concerned. 
The final respect in which the domestic process could be said to 
be inefficient is that implementation has been faulty. We have talked, 
for example, about subsidies for infant export industries. Justifica-
tion for these subsidies is found in the externalities that accompany 
the introduction of new goods of a certain type originating in a 
particular country. But any effort to devise and implement a scheme 
of subsidies that reflects, with substantial accuracy, the externalities 
actually created will encounter great difficulties. The program may 
easily degenerate into an indiscriminate grant of subsidies, involving 
the risk of political corruption and adding an element of uncertainty 
that makes intelligent decision-making about resource allocation ex-
tremely difficult.65 It may be, moreover, that alternative measures, such 
as the government's providing information about foreign markets 
to domestic producers and about domestic products to foreign buyers, 
are better calculated to deal with the basic problem. We do not 
believe, however, that an international body could be empowered 
65. See J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 53. 
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to make a judgment of this kind. What really must be said after all 
is that a domestic measure has been badly, if not corruptly, ad-
ministered. 
Thus we are not very sanguine that a useful international stand-
ard can be devised. The key element in any process of constructive 
change is a willingness by the various countries concerned to ap-
praise the effectiveness of the domestic political process in passing 
legislation granting subsidies. 
B. An International Political Institution 
The final possibility that we ·wish to consider is that of lodging 
power in an international body to deal authoritatively with a sector 
of activity marked by externalities. Two types of institutions should 
be distinguished. In the first, power is exercised by the international 
body on the basis of an agreed upon standard or the votes of individ-
uals. In the second, it is assumed that each country through its politi-
cal process aggregates individual preferences and then votes in an 
international legislature. 
The first type of institution would necessarily involve considera-
tion of the fundamental question of how individuals, if they wish to 
maximize their welfare, should group themselves and structure the 
organization governing them. We cannot, of course, deal with this 
hard question. We ·will, however, offer some general observations 
which suggest the difficulties that will inevitably be encountered 
if the problem of externalities is approached by seeking to establish 
an inclusive political unit. 
The basic reason for establishing a larger political unit is that 
external benefits or costs spill over beyond the borders of the exist-
ing political entity and are not, therefore, taken into account in the 
decision-making process of the smaller entity. Thus, if the countries 
in a particular region have. close relationships, expenditures for re-
search and development or education in one country will have an 
important impact on the others. 66 A decision based upon all of the 
66. See, e.g., France V-:_ Commission of the European Communities, No. 47 /69 (Eur. 
Ct. J. June 25, 1970), in which subsidies to the French textile industry for research and 
development, financed by a tax imposed on all textile products both domestic and 
imported, were held to be incompatible with article 92, paragraph ll(c) of the EEC 
Treaty governing the grant of "state aids" by member states. One French argument 
was that since research and development expenditures created spillover benefits for 
textile manufacturers located in other member states, their imports to France might 
properly be taxed without, in the language of article 92, paragraph ll(c), "adversely 
affect[ing] trading conditions to such an extent as would be contrary to the common 
interest." This argument, though it was accepted in principle, was rejected by the Court 
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effects in all of the countries will, in these circumstances, increase 
over-all welfare in the region. 67 
There are, however, formidable difficulties in devising an appro-
priate political system to give effect to these externalities. The basic 
dilemma is that as the size of the group embraced by the political 
unit increases, conflicting forces dictate that greater or lesser majori-
ties be required to authorize government action. As the group grows 
larger, particularly if heterogeneity increases, a particular individual 
faces a greater risk of an outcome departing from his preference 
being imposed by whatever majority is designated as sufficient. He 
therefore will want a rule approaching unanimity to diminish this 
risk. But, on the other hand, the larger and more heterogeneous the 
group, the more costly is the process of reaching agreement. For this 
reason a rule requiring much less than unanimity may be desirable.68 
partly because of the difficulty of determining the correct amount and duration of the 
subsidy and partly because of an inequality in the benefits betlveen France and the 
rest of the EEC, which was not appropriately reflected by the method of financing. 
67. Article 92, paragraph 3(b) of the EEC Treaty, which provides that a subsidy 
"intended to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest" may be deemed to be "compatible with the Common Market," represents an 
acceptance of this basic idea. 
68. J. BUCHANAN 8: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 63-84, analyze the issues con-
fronted in choosing a decision-making rule. The basic objective of each individual is 
to minimize the sum of the costs of reaching agreement and being subject to a measure 
not in conformity with his preferences. The rule an individual chooses depends on his 
prediction of the likelihood that various desirable and undesirable measures will be 
passed under different decision-making rules. See note 52 supra. It would appear that 
the same considerations would obtain when a national representative, assumed to be 
speaking for the aggregated individual preferences in his country, is choosing an ap-
propriate decision-making rule for an international body. 
Article 92 of the EEC Treaty appears to be an attempt to resolve certain conflicts 
inherent in dealing internationally with problems of externalities through collective 
decision-making. It isolates first a class of subsidies (for consumers in general, victims 
of natural disasters, and regions affected by the division of Germany) as "compatible" 
with Common Market principles of nondistortion in competition, apparently because 
it was recognized that government intervention might be required and that the indi-
vidual countries would wish to formulate their own policies. Article 92 then isolates a 
class of subsidies (for depressed regions, projects of European-wide interest, and de-
velopment programs) that "may be deemed to be compatible with the Common Mar-
ket." Finally, it specifies that certain subsidies proposed by the Commission (a group 
of nine members appointed to act according to their perception of European, rather 
than national, interests) and approved by a "qualified majority vote" of the Council 
(that is, a weighted vote giving the national representatives of France, Germany, and 
Italy four votes, Belgium and The Netherlands tlvo, and Luxembourg one) also "may 
be deemed to be compatible with the Common Market." Article 93 invests in the Com-
mission power to determine whether those subsidy programs that "may be" acceptable 
under Article 92 are in fact compatible with the Common Market, subject to review 
by the Court of Justice. However, the Council, by unanimous vote, may approve any 
subsidy. 
Article 92 therefore recognizes certain subsidies without further inquiry. In con-
junction with Article 93, it sets up a system through which another class of subsidies 
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For an individual to be made better off by becoming a member 
of a more inclusive political entity, the gains from taking account of 
additional external effects must be greater than the diminution in 
welfare that he suffers by having power conferred on the larger 
entity. We speculate that this advantage will exist only if activities 
in the countries involved are closely related and the population of 
the affected countries have substantially homogeneous views on the 
relevant issues. 69 
The second type of international institution would be one em-
powered to deal authoritatively with externalities on the basis of a 
voting process participated in by countries on the assumption that 
individual preferences have been aggregated in the domestic political 
process. It is very difficult to predict the contribution such an insti-
tution could make. Each country is presumably most familiar with 
the external costs that it suffers and the external benefits it realizes 
as a result of the actions of other countries. Each is also presumably 
generally aware that its own actions have similar effects on other 
countries. If agreement taking these factors into account can improve 
the welfare of the countries involved, it will occur. All that the pos-
specifically identified by their objectives may be justified by the Commission and the 
Court of Justice, which presumably represent the informed opinion of the supranational 
interest. A third class of unspecified subsidies may be approved in the same manner 
only if they are certified by a weighted vote of the Council, This weighting is appar-
ently designed to assign voting power in proportion to the potential harm that a par• 
ticular country will suffer if the preferences effectuated by the subsidy clash with those 
held in the country. Finally, any subsidy may be approved if all countries agree to 
permit it. 
69. Article 92 is an obvious example of the kind of cooperation we are describing-
that is, collective action in a wide range of situations among nations with relative 
homogeneous fundamental interests. It is, however, only an enabling provision permit• 
ting individual countries to act. More significant in this connection is the effort cm• 
bodied in the European Social Fund, EEC Treaty, articles 123-28, in which contribution 
is required from all countries because each presumably benefits from subsidies that 
reduce the private costs of relocation and retraining of employees located throughout 
the EEC. 
A similar conformity of interest may exist among a large number of countries with 
respect to a limited class of activity. One illustration of this situation is the Interna• 
tional Coffee Agreement, opened for signature March 18-31, 1968, [1968) 19 U.S,T, 6333, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6584. Here, countries with a wide and varied range of fundamental in• 
terests have agreed to cooperate in one narrow area by limiting the amount of coffee 
exported from predominantly developing countries and imported into predominantly 
developed countries. The stated objective is to assist diversification by restricting pro• 
duction and maintaining price. The Agreement contains an elaborate set of voting 
rules in which votes are weighted to reflect the magnitude of producer and consumer 
interests. On important issues a two-thirds majority of both importing and exporting 
blocs is required. The Agreement in effect requires all consuming countries to share 
in the aid-granting and (presumably) all producing countries to restrict output, See 
c. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 496-537. 
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sibility of some species of international compulsion can contribute 
is to induce revelation of preferences that would otherwise be con-
cealed by potential "free riders." For example, each of the countries 
·wishing to alleviate suffering in the developing countries by widen-
ing opportunities in their domestic markets for products originating 
in the developing countries might wait for the others to act, particu-
larly if the domestic displacement accompanying increased imports 
were of great concern.70 
An international legislature competent to deal with these ques-
tions could compel action and consequently induce all the countries 
to reveal their true preferences. The question, however, is whether, 
in light of the relatively small number of countries playing a major 
role in questions of this kind and the great heterogeneity of opinion 
among those having vital interests, any country could confidently 
predict that it would be made better off over time by subjecting these 
questions to authoritative resolution by an international body in 
which unanimity is not required. It may well be that the present 
system of multilateral bargaining is a better method. In that system, 
the revelation of preferences is induced by the expectation of gain 
from concessions obtainable only if all interested countries combine 
to provide benefits in return, but no country is compelled to accept 
an outcome that it does not want.71 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have completed our search for a standard and appear not to 
have found one. Our conclusion, simply, is that the problem is at 
bottom one of devising an appropriate social organization to guide 
individual preference and capacity so that over-all welfare is in-
creased. We believe, however, that there is an advantage in acknowl-
edging that this is what is involved. Invocation of a "free trade" ideal 
as providing a self-evident answer to questions of this kind serves to 
obfuscate the difficult issues that must be faced. We realize, of course, 
70. Efforts, through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), to achieve agreement on over-all trade preferences for developing countries 
have in fact been made. The developed countries, while willing to adhere in principle 
to such an arrangement, have not been prepared to subject themselves to an authori-
tative international regime. See UNCTAD, Report of the Special Committee on Prefer-
ences, Supp. 6A, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36/Rev. 1, at 5-6, 40-41 (1970); Comment, 
Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries: The UNCTAD Agreed Con-
clusions, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 111 (1971). 
71. For descriptions of multilateral bargaining under GATT, see K. DAM, supra 
note 1, at 61-79; J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 217-23; Norwood, The Kennedy Round: 
A Try at Linear Trade Negotiations, 12 J. LAw & EcoN. 297 (1969). 
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that it is possible that a person disapproving of a preference held in 
a particular country might wish to cast his objection in apparently 
neutral "free trade" terms. If by this is meant some preference for 
increased international involvement, then we have no quarrel with 
it. Indeed we share it.72 If the suggestion is, however, that a particular 
result is better because it is more consonant with a "free trade" 
ideal deducible from the theory of comparative advantage, we are 
unable to square such a claim ·with our analysis. 
72. We believe that there are favorable externalities that arise from trade. These 
include the benefits of a more diverse selection of goods, which are reaped even by 
those who purchase domestic products; the incentive to domestic innovation benefiting 
consumers, which is promoted by increased (foreign) competition; and the possible 
reduction in the incidence of conflict among nations, which learn more about each 
other through trade. These consequences may not be fully taken into account in either 
the market or the domestic political process essentially because the benefits are widely 
dispersed and difficult to quantify. There may, however, be some groups with a vested 
interest in increasing international trade who can exercise substantial influence on do• 
mestic policies. See A. LANYI, supra note 51; Willett &: Tower, supra note 51, at 290 
(suggesting that central bankers may be such a group). 
